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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
______ 
PER CURIAM 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 In these related appeals, Gennaro Rauso, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 
appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
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Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint and orders denying his motions to vacate the 
dismissal order and for other relief.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
 Rauso filed a complaint against Thomas Giambrone, a District Court employee, 
and two John Doe defendants seeking money damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  Rauso 
claimed violations of his constitutional rights in connection with Giambrone’s alleged 
refusal to docket his submissions, and his return of those submissions to him, after a 
District Judge ordered Rauso to stop filing papers in District Court.   
The United States filed a Statement of Interest on Behalf of Defendants and in 
Support of Sua Sponte Dismissal asserting that Giambrone is immune from suit.  In an 
order entered February 1, 2018, the District Court dismissed Rauso’s claims against 
Giambrone and any unnamed Clerk’s Office employee on absolute immunity grounds.  
On March 12, 2018, the District Court denied Rauso’s motion to vacate the dismissal 
order, which it construed as a motion for reconsideration.  Rauso filed an appeal, which is 
the subject of C.A. No. 18-1777.  Rauso also appeals two post-judgment orders, which 
are the subject of C.A. Nos. 18-2866 and 18-3245.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.     
Absolute judicial immunity extends to officials other than judges when they 
exercise a discretionary judgment as part of their function, Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993), or when they undertake a function pursuant to the 
direction or order of the court.  Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 287 (7th Cir. 2004) (per 
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curiam); see also Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  We agree with the District Court that Giambrone is immune from liability 
with regard to Rauso’s allegations that he improperly refused to docket his motions after 
the District Court issued a filing injunction against him.   
Rauso avers in his complaint that Giambrone told his wife that he alone decided 
not to file his motions, that Giambrone acted outside the scope of his duties, and that the 
District Court did not explicitly direct the Clerk or Giambrone not to accept his motions, 
but these allegations are insufficient to raise a question as to whether Giambrone was 
implementing the Court’s order that Rauso terminate filing papers.  Rauso’s complaint 
reflects that his new motions were related to the proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 
which the filing injunction was issued.  In addition, the docket for Rauso’s criminal 
action reflects that the District Court ordered the return of papers that Rauso had 
submitted for filing close in time to his submission of two of the motions at issue.   
The District Court also denied Rauso’s motion to vacate the dismissal order 
because he had not shown that there was an intervening change in law, new evidence, or 
a clear error of law or fact.  See Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard for a motion for reconsideration).  Rauso primarily 
argued that the District Court had not given him an opportunity to be heard and that 
Giambrone had waived an immunity defense by failing to timely respond to his 
complaint after it was served.  The District Court’s dismissal was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A, which requires a court to screen and dismiss a prisoner’s complaint seeking 
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monetary relief from a governmental employee who is immune from such relief.1  To the 
extent Rauso contends that dismissal under § 1915A is improper after service of the 
complaint, we need not decide this question.  The complaint was subject to sua sponte 
dismissal under the screening provision in § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), which applies to in forma 
pauperis litigants such as Rauso, and explicitly states that a court shall dismiss a case “at 
any time” where the action seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 
from such relief.  Even if § 1915A did not provide a basis for the sua sponte dismissal of 
the complaint, the dismissal was proper under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).2 
Rauso also argued in his motion to vacate the dismissal order that the District 
Court failed to adjudicate his motion to correct the docket, which asserted that the docket 
incorrectly reflects that an Assistant United States Attorney represents Giambrone.  
Rauso relies on the United States’ Statement of Interest, which stated that it had yet to 
receive authorization to provide individual-capacity representation to Giambrone, and the 
fact that the attorney did not enter an appearance on Giambrone’s behalf.  To the extent 
the attorney should not be noted on the docket as representing Giambrone, no relief is 
due.  The District Court properly dismissed Rauso’s complaint pursuant to the screening 
provision in § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).  Whether or not Giambrone was represented is of no 
                                              
1The District Court also refers to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) 
in its order but it did not rule that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.  We do not 
construe the order as dismissing the complaint under these rules. 
 
2Rauso cites Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1990), in support of his 
argument that the District Court could not sua sponte dismiss his complaint once it had 
6 
 
significance.  To the extent Rauso contends that the District Court erred in considering 
the Statement of Interest, he has shown no error in this regard.3 
Rauso also appeals the District Court’s order entered July 20, 2018 denying his 
motion to reopen his case and vacate the orders dismissing his complaint and denying his 
motion to vacate the dismissal order.  The District Court construed this filing as another 
motion for reconsideration and again ruled that Rauso did not satisfy the applicable 
standard.  Although the time for seeking reconsideration had passed, Rauso did not show 
that the orders should be vacated under any standard.  Rauso reiterated the arguments, 
discussed above, that the District Court did not give him the opportunity to be heard 
before dismissing his complaint, failed to adjudicate his motion to correct the docket, and 
improperly relied on the Statement of Interest.  
Rauso also argued that he was denied an evidentiary hearing on his motion to 
vacate the dismissal order, but he did not show that a hearing was warranted.  He also 
argued that the District Court should have applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 
to his motion, not the standard for a motion for reconsideration.  Rule 54(b), however, is 
implicated when an order decides fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties.  See Fed. R. Civ P. 54(b).  The rule is inapplicable here.  Rauso 
                                                                                                                                                  
been served, but Roman construed an earlier version of the in forma pauperis statute. 
3The United States filed the Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which 
provides that the Attorney General may send an officer of the Department of Justice to 
attend to the interests of the United States in a pending suit.  The United States noted a 
concern that suits against court staff interfere with the orderly administration of justice. 
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also asserted in his brief that the District Court has yet to issue a final decision in his case 
on numerous grounds.  For example, he argued that the dismissal order does not satisfy 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), which requires that a judgment be set out in a 
separate document.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).  A failure to comply with this rule, 
however, does not affect an order’s finality for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Bankers 
Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 385-86 (1978) (per curiam).  These arguments are 
without merit.   
After the District Court denied Rauso’s motion to reopen and vacate its earlier 
orders, he filed two more motions asserting that the Court’s orders do not satisfy Rule 
58(a) and suggesting that we lack jurisdiction over his present appeals as a result.  He 
asked the District Court to relabel its decisions to reflect that they are “opinions” as 
opposed to “orders.”  He also moved the Court to issue an order pursuant to Rule 54(b) or 
to enter a final judgment.  In denying these motions, the District Court explained that the 
sole purpose of Rule 58 is to clarify when the time for appeal begins to run and, as stated 
above, that a failure to satisfy Rule 58(a) does not affect the finality of an order.  Bankers 
Trust Co., 435 U.S. at 385-86.  The District Court noted that the orders were intended to 
be final decisions, that Rauso understood them as such, and that he had appealed.  The 
District Court did not err in denying these motions. 
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Because these appeals do not raise a substantial question, we will affirm the 
District Court’s orders.  See Third Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (providing for summary action where 
no substantial question is presented by an appeal).4  
                                              
4Rauso has filed various motions in this Court, many of which raise the same arguments 
addressed in this opinion.  All of Rauso’s outstanding motions, including his motion to 
compel the District Court to decide his motion to correct the record, his second motion to 
correct the record, his motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeals without prejudice or to 
consolidate his appeals, and his motions to reconsider orders issued by the Clerk, are 
denied.  
